Abstract
Introduction. The Chinese Civil War was a time of rapprochement between the United States and the Republic of China, but there were enormous difficulties and contradictions between the two countries. Methods and materials. In this regard, it seems that the information of the two main agencies of the U.S. intelligence community is able to significantly supplement the picture of the interaction between the two countries and allows better understanding of why at some point Washington was forced to almost completely abandon its support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The article is based on the principles of historicism and consistency, as well as the methods of historical comparative studies. Analysis and results. The excessive level of corruption, which involved numerous American structures and officials, internal conflicts in the Republic’s government that influenced the situation and the course of the confrontation and were consecrated in FBI and CIA documents, contributed to the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the policy of the unconditional support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime, but the Communist victory and the establishment of the PRC made, in the absence of other real alternatives, it necessary to continue to support the Republic. The new information makes it possible to better understand how the White House treated the leader of “democratic” China and his family, as well as to better understand the role of intelligence and counterintelligence in these processes and the place of Soviet intelligence in the final stages of the heavy civil war in China (1927–1950). The materials presented in the article and their analysis show specifics and differences in approaches of the FBI and CIA on the example of work on China. The article is based on FBI and CIA archives and covers the period from 1943 to 1949.
Highlights
The Chinese Civil War was a time of rapprochement between the United States and the Republic of China, but there were enormous difficulties and contradictions between the two countries
It seems that the information of the two main agencies of the U.S intelligence community is able to significantly supplement the picture of the interaction between the two countries and allows better understanding of why at some point Washington was forced to almost completely abandon its support for the Chiang Kai-shek regime
The article is based on the principles of historicism and consistency, as well as the methods of historical comparative studies
Summary
President Chiang Kaishek’s Advisers and Personal Staff. 25 August 1948. CIA. ‘A.A.’ (Map) Japanese and Chinese Held Areas in China (Kuang-Chou (Canton) (1944 Ed.) and Tab. ‘A.B.’ (Map) Situation – China – 1 February 1945 (5 Feb. 1945 Ed.). Jeans R.B. The CIA and Third Force Movements in China During the Early Cold War: The Great American Dream. Hoover to San Francisco FBI and All. 9 March 1943. Memo from Director Hoover to Lawrence M.C. Smith, Chief of Special War Policies Unit. Edgar Hoover’s Official and Personal Letters – China)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
