Понятие нацистской морали: вызов моральной философии

Abstract

Thinking about Auschwitz is bound to being moral, but Auschwitz turned into a challenge to the very idea of morality, the collapse of its entire conceptual con­tent. One of the main challenges lies in the concept of Nazi ethic: the prevailing understanding of morality in everyday consciousness and moral rhetory does not allow us to consider it as an oxymoron. This is indicated by abundant moral rhetoric, preoccupation with moral problems, the presence of everything which the idea of ​​morality is connected with – norms, values, the dominance of duty over inclination, appeal to moral imperativeness and conscience, ideas of good and evil, images and lists of virtues, moral evaluation of yourself and others, ideas of duty, dignity, responsibility, the primacy of morality over law. The idea of fighting evil, the image of which is set by the ideology of Nazism, became the moral basis of Auschwitz, reproducing the logic of a “just war”. At the heart of Nazi morality there is the gap between a virtuous person and his deed, which allows that killing does not makes someone a murderer. Killing is also seen divid­edly: the most important are its motives and how it is done, which should be “hu­mane”, clement both for the murderers and for the victims, and therefore morally sanctioned. The author shows that morality is an important part of Auschwitz me­chanics. Nazi morality is not opposed by any other expanded morality, but only by individual actions of rescue, not mediated by moral ideology. Disallowance of the concept of Nazi morality closes the idea of morality to non-killing as a pre-non-moral beginning that is not a norm or a prohibition mediated by moral ideas.