Abstract
Among the most peculiar traits of Kant’s critical philosophy is the contention that, while we can know our moral maxims and can thus reflect on our actions from a moral point of view, we cannot really know whether in a given situation our actions are actually motivated by those maxims. This means that, although we have a firm sense of our moral duties, we can never be certain whether some particular action of ours is done from duty or simply in accordance with it. This view is voiced in several of Kant’s writings. Most prominent is its appearance in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, but we also find it in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and in The Metaphysics of Morals, and it is even present in smaller writings such as “On a Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy” or “On the Common Saying: That may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice”. It is against this background that I revisit Kant’s remarks on the lack of self-knowledge regarding the motives of our proper actions. I suggest a reading of Kant’s views on this issue in the light of a tradition reaching back to Plato, in which man’s (moral) self-relation is shaped in an irreducible way by both self-consciousness and self-ignorance.
Highlights
Одна из наиболее характерных особенностей критической философии Канта состоит в утверждении, что, хотя мы можем знать наши моральные максимы и, таким образом, размышлять о наших действиях с моральной точки зрения, мы не можем знать, действительно ли в данной ситуации наши действия мотивированы этими максимами
Among the most peculiar traits of Kant’s critical philosophy is the contention that, while we can know our moral maxims and can reflect on our actions from a moral point of view, we cannot really know whether in a given situation our actions are motivated by those maxims
This means that, we have a firm sense of our moral duties, we can never be certain whether some particular action of ours is done from duty or in accordance with it
Summary
Предполагается, что кантовский скептицизм имеет свои аргументативные предпосылки в основных положениях его критической философии, к тому же для Канта также важно сохранить индивидуальное сознание ради установления границ человеческого самопознания. Die Vermutung liegt daher nahe, dass Kants Skeptizismus in den Grundannahmen seiner kritischen Philosophie zwar seine argumentativen Voraussetzungen hat, es ihm zudem aber auch wichtig ist, das individuelle Bewusstsein für die Grenzen menschlichen Selbstwissens wachzuhalten. Что кантовский скептицизм является необходимым следствием фундаментальных гипотез кантовского критицизма и что по этой причине Кант не может не рассматривать человеческое самопознание как ограниченное, если он не собирается заложить мину под свой критицизм. Dass Kants Skeptizismus eine notwendige Folge grundlegender Annahmen seines Kritizismus ist und er daher gar nicht anders kann, als das menschliche Selbstwissen für begrenzt zu halten, wenn anders er seinen Kritizismus nicht unterminieren will.
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