가족경영자가 연구개발투자에 미치는 영향 - 사외이사 초과선임의 조절효과를 중심으로 -

Abstract

In Korea, the outside director system has been enacted after financial crisis in 1997. This legislation was the result of social consensus followed by so-called ‘global standard’. However, the outside director system is based on agency theory that assumes the separation of ownership and management of firms and that CEOs are selfish and opportunistic. This research starts from the question if the prescription of agency theory can work in Korean firms where ownership and management is no thoroughly separated. Moreover, all CEOs can not be selfish and opportunistic especially in Korea where family CEOs who have blood tie with controlling shareholders are prevalent. Stewardship theory assumes that CEOs have higher level of needs such as altruism and self-actualization, identify themselves with their firms, and reflect their success on firms’ success. This kind of CEOs are steward CEOs. The family CEOs are typical steward CEOs in that they identify themselves with their firms. First, this research investigates the positive effect of family CEO on R&D investment which is long-term risky investment. This positive effect of family CEOs is derived from both agency and stewardship theories. Second, the moderating effect of outside director system is examined. Competing hypotheses are established: positive moderating effect from agency theory and negative moderating effect from stewardship theory. The empirical result presents that the effect of family CEOs on R&D investment is significantly positive and that the moderating effect of outside director system is significantly negative. It means that there cannot be a universe and ‘global standard’ type of corporate governance structure and that the internal control mechanisms based on agency theory should be carefully adopted considering each countries’ unique characteristics.