한국과 중국의 기업임원평가제도 비교 -금융기관의 임원 보수제도를 중심으로-

Abstract

The executive remuneration system is an important factor of determining the governance structure, transparency and executives’ performance. Recently, some executives in China have been criticized for being overcompensated for their performance. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to see if the executive remuneration system of Chinese private companies is doing its best to lower agent costs and boost executives’ willingness to work. In order to achieve this goal, the study compared the executive remuneration system of Chinese private companies with the similar cultural and institutional system of Korea’s executive remuneration system. And the literature research method was used to establish standards and categories for comparing the systems of the two countries. Based on these five comparison criteria and tournament theory, the system related to corporate executive remuneration in Korea and China were compared. In addition, the two countries’ financial institutions were targeted for comparison. This is because financial institutions always have agent problems due to their industrial characteristics and have strong control over executives ‘remuneration. The typical problem is that there is a relatively low link between executives’ remuneration and corporate performance, insufficient regulations on long-term incentives, and failure to disclose information related to executive remuneration at a glance. In addition, it is necessary to reorganize related laws and regulations in detail rather than focusing only on post-control in the process of controlling executive remuneration. These findings suggest the direction in which the executive pay system of Chinese companies should be improved. Above all, efforts should be made to improve the situation in which controlling shareholders controlled corporate decision-making and to establish a modern corporate system. In addition, information should be more transparent to mitigate agent issues from shareholders and executives. Specifically, the executive compensation disclosure system should be improved more transparently. Finally, when incentives are provided for executives, it is necessary to further to activate the remuneration deferral system and conduct specific research on long-term incentives.