아크라시아 사례들을 통해 본 자율성과 감정의 문제:타폴레의 관심-기반 이론을 중심으로*

Abstract

Over the last few decades ‘respect for autonomy’ has emerged as one of the most important ethical principles governing modern medicine. This is due at least in part to the influence of Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics. However, there seem to be two major problems with this principle of respect for autonomy: one is that it has become something of a dogma; the other is that the concept of autonomy is unclear. In many areas of life, including that of medical care, it is difficult to discern which agents are truly autonomous, which decisions (or acts) are truly autonomous and, accordingly, which of these are to be respected. It seems that a better understanding of autonomy is very much needed. This article responds to that need by providing a careful examination of both rationalist and care-based conceptions of autonomy. It argues that rationalist conceptions of autonomy cannot account for cases of akrasia, and that care-based conceptions of autonomy help to illuminate the intimate relationship between autonomy and the emotions.