ПРАВО НА РЕЛИГИОЗНУЮ АВТОНОМИЮ И ПРЕЦЕДЕНТНАЯ ПРАКТИКА ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА

Abstract

In this study, the author addresses the problem of the definition and structure of the right to religious autonomy. The object of the study was the content of the two manifestations of this right that the author identified: internal governance and doctrinal autonomy in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. The aim of this article is to determine the main areas of protection of the right to religious autonomy of religious associations and the positive experience applicable in the Russian Federation. The author describes the role of the right to religious autonomy, which is an integral part of pluralism in a democratic society and, therefore, acts as a center for protection provided by freedom of conscience. The study is based on the theoretical material of the works of both Russian (P.V. Sergeev, Yu.E. Fedotova, M.O. Shakhov) and foreign (M.E. Chopko, M.F. Moses) researchers. The extensive law enforcement practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the regulations of the European Union are also used. The methodological basis of the study is dialectical, comparative legal, formal legal, and other methods. In particular, the use of the dialectical method helped to determine the content of the concept of the right to religious autonomy, to study the dynamics of the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding a “balanced approach” to protect the autonomy of the internal management of religious associations. The use of comparative legal and formal legal methods helped to identify correlations between the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and acts adopted within the European Union. The use of the functional method made it possible to investigate the place and role of European institutions and the nature of their governing influence on the provision and protection of the right to religious autonomy to various religious associations, including those representing a religious minority. As a result, the author comes to the conclusion that religious autonomy in its two possible manifestations—internal governance and doctrinal autonomy—directly follows from the content of the powers of freedom of conscience. Both of the manifestations are protected by European regulations although such protection cannot be considered as absolute. On the one hand, the right to religious autonomy is an integral part of the external manifestation of religious beliefs; on the other, its universal protection will jeopardize the protection of the rights of others. Nevertheless, in a situation in which the governing influence of European states is limited and the enforcement practice of the European Court of Human Rights is not entirely consistent, it seems that European institutions are aware of the importance of the right to religious autonomy. Therefore, the authorities resolve problems associated with its implementation pragmatically, trying to balance it with other rights and legitimate interests.