信访机制的异化与基层治理的转型——从武汉山乡个案展开

Abstract

The so-called alienation of the time-honored “letters and visits” (xinfang) system is best seen in the case of land requisition and resident relocation in Shanxiang of Wuhan municipality, in which the appeal process of letter-writing and government office visit itself underwent a transition from consultation through rights defense to finally profiteering. Behind this alienation is the introduction of a new model of governance that centered on the utilization of local resources and its substitution for the traditional model that relied primarily on persuasion, education, and mediation and also turned to compulsion and punishment as supplementary measures; the latter, however, has lost its ground under the condition of a market economy and the self-interested orientation of local governments. As a result, local authorities opted for either the direct management of letters and visits by taking advantage of the greatly increased resources at their disposal or the indirect management by reallocating the resources and thereby mobilizing relevant social segments for that end. This article questions the legitimacy of the resource-intensive approach and instead proposes a new solution on the principle of legitimate interests, which aims to safeguard the rightful interests of both local residents and the grassroots government, and which had to be materialized by grassroots governments through their budgetary regulations.在武汉山乡的征地拆迁个案中，上访人经历了从协商型上访、维权型上访到谋利型上访的尴尬过程，这意味着信访机制的异化。从基层信访治理实践来看，资源媒介型治理模式是信访机制异化的根本原因。在资源总量大幅增加的条件下，基层政府通过利益诱导来对上访进行直接治理，或者通过资源配置来调动社会力量参与，从而实现对上访的间接治理。资源媒介型治理模式是思想教育型治理模式的替代。市场经济条件和基层政府的自利性，使得以说服、教育、调解为主，强制、惩罚为辅的思想教育型治理正在丧失正当性。资源媒介型治理不是权力的合法运用，因此信访治理转型任重道远。需要确立正当利益原则，对民众和基层政府的利益诉求以正当利益为标准，并通过财政预算制度来确保基层政府遵守正当利益原则。 (This article is in Chinese.)