Abstract

This article seeks to examine Japan’s export control against South Korea in 2019, within the framework of economic sanction studies in the field of international political economy. Is it effective diplomatic policy to use economic means for the purpose of achieving political ends? So far, economic sanction studies have pointed out that the effect of economic sanctions is maximized when: 1) the sanction come from a country that shares historical, cultural, and strategic interest with the target country; and 2) the target country is a democracy. In this article, however, we argue that efforts to resolve diplomatic conflicts based on national identity through economic means are likely to fail. The employment of economic sanction between countries engaged in identity conflict leads to an enhancement of threat perception. As a result, the target country tends to focus on diversifying import sources and developing alternative products. Also, the economic pressure amplifies domestic backlash in the target country, resulting in a widespread political movement opposing economic sanctions. This means that industrial and diplomatic policies in the target country are quickly transformed to reduce the effect of economic sanctions. In this regard, Japan’s export control failed to attain the intended diplomatic purpose, namely changing the policy of the South Korean government.

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