플랫폼 경쟁과 멀티호밍 제한: 교차 네트워크 효과의 비대칭성과 구매자 유형의 불완비정보

Abstract

Purpose - This paper aims to analyze competition between two platforms with asymmetric cross indirect network effects under hidden buyer sensitivity. Platforms are differentiated by indirect network effects toward buyers that are also differentiated privately with sensitivity to the effects.
 Design/Methodology/Approach - We set up a platform competition model based on a signaling game and thus characterized a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A nature selects two types of buyer with a certain probability. Each type of buyer chooses one platform (single-homing). Sellers can choose either single-homing or multi-homing with price setting and complete trade with buyers.
 Findings - First, the leading platform with stronger cross network effects does not always mandate exclusive homing for sellers. Second, in a two-sided market where the small platform is significantly weak, a leading platform does not mind seller multihoming if buyers sensitive to indirect network effects are numerous enough. However, price discrimination under seller multihoming lowers social welfare. Third, when platforms are close enough in indirect network effects, a leading platform always wants to impose mandatory exclusive homing on sellers. A seller can raise prices and narrow trades to buyers with high willingness-to-pay only responding to mandatory exclusive homing, which lowers social welfare.
 Research Implications - Asymmetry between platforms in indirect network effects and buyer hidden sensitivities to the effects must be scrutinized to design effective policy instruments to promote competition in the platform market.