행동과학의 렌즈로 재조명한 정치적 경기순환론

Abstract

The political business cycle theory demonstrates that incumbent politicians opportunistically manipulate macroeconomic business cycles such as inflation or unemployment to further their chances of re-election. Since Nordhaus’s (1975) pioneering model on the topic, both economists and political sciences have long examined the interdependence of political and macroeconomic outcomes within various contexts. Notwithstanding the promise of the theory of political business cycle, less attention has been paid to its theoretical assumptions—voters’ formation of the image for the incumbent and the durational effect of political manipulation of macroeconomic variables. Drawing insights from behavioral science, this study examines how macroeconomic outcomes in the election year affect the percentage of votes in the next election year in the Korean local government contexts. Findings suggest that the assumptions of political business cycle theory need to be expanded to enhance its theoretical development and practical applications.