СМЕРТЬ СМЕРТИ СУБЪЕКТА

Abstract

In modern philosophy, there is a synthesis of the main directions of classical philosophy of language of the early 20th century: analytical philosophy, hermeneutics and structuralism/poststructuralism. The article provides a brief overview of the idea of the disappearance of the subject in two of the three indicated natures – (post)structuralism, as well as in one of the school analytical philosophy – «critical rationalism». The author seeks to show the lack of meaningfulness of the thesis of the «death of the subject» in the context of the modern development of philosophy. The ideas of «death of the subject» and «death of the author» appear to the author as only slogans that contradict real history. As one example, the article notes the presence of authorship and the author in ancient literature, and the absence of this authorial individual in the scientific discourse of antiquity itself. The evolution of the category of subject in the Middle Ages is briefly examined. It is argued that both in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, the categories of subject and object are not yet connected in any way with the human individual, but retain a pure logical-grammatical interpretation: the subject is just the subject, the object of thought, and the object is just the predicate, predicate. The significance of medieval nominalism is also noted, which influenced the subsequent inversion of these categories: the subjective existence of the scholastics is transformed into an object, which leads to the category of objective reality, and objective existence turns into a subject (the Cartesian subject as an individual cognitive mind). Finally, the article examines some interpretations of the category of subject in 20th-century philosophy. Controversial aspects of these interpretations are criticized. The tendency towards a synthesis of various philosophical trends of the 20th century in the field of philosophy of language is also considered. As an additional classification, the author uses and analyzes the already traditional (after the works of R. Rorty) division of philosophy into «philosophy as a science» and «philosophy as literature». Philosophy as a science is seen by the author as the mainstream, and philosophy as literature as marginalia of the European tradition.