Abstract

This article discusses the so-called “paradigm of evidence” proposed by the his­torian of culture, Carlo Ginzburg. This epistemological paradigm was formed at the end of the XIX century, and since then it has been successfully developing as a scientific methodology applicable in the field of humanitarian knowledge. The main properties of the knowledge produced by this paradigm, according to Ginzburg, are its empirical character, presumptive, and emphasis on individual features of the object of study. In contrast to Ginzburg’s theory, this article sug­gests that the “paradigm of evidence” in its application to science of any kind (both humanitarian and natural science) inevitably loses its specificity. For this reason, it cannot be considered as a complete and self-sufficient scientific para­digm. At the same time, the author of the article draws attention to the temporal aspect of the “paradigm of evidence”, and the way this paradigm works in the area of everyday practice. The above aspects are amenable to understanding (and, to some extent, theorizing) with the help of the methodology of the philos­ophy of history and philosophical existentialism. The article shows that with such a review it is possible to detect the constituting and creative potential of the evidence paradigm. It is also possible to argue that the evidence paradigm is capable of exerting a mediated effect on theoretical scientific knowledge.

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