Отказ от свободной оценки доказательств на примере «амнистии капитала»: очередной удар по публичности уголовного процесса России

Abstract

The relevance of the work is caused by the socio-political demand to change the criminal procedural law, taking into account its focus on the creation of a favourable investment and business climate. At the same time, science has not convincingly justified the real reasons for changing the criminal procedural law in this direction, which leads to its chaotic changes, often inconsistent with the fundamental principles of criminal procedure, its purpose. The purpose of the work is to study the impact of legal norms ensuring the implementation of "amnesty of capital" on the free evaluation of evidence, as well as its ability to ensure the implementation of public interest of all members of society aimed at combating crime. The following set of research methods was used effectively. First, the dialectical method of knowledge - as a key method in the consideration of legal norms that ensure the implementation of "amnesty of capital" in relation to the general problems of criminal procedure. Secondly, the method of modelling - in the study of how the theory and law enforcement practice will be affected by the change in the criminal procedural form caused by the "amnesty of capital". Thirdly, the formal-legal method - in identifying the specifics of the construction of legal constructions in the rules of criminal procedure providing for "amnesty of capital". Fourthly, the historical-legal method - in the analysis of legal constructions and the practice of their application at different stages of historical development. Fifth, the statistical method - in the collection and analysis of statistical data relating to the research topic. The results of the study lead to the following conclusions. Firstly, the free assessment of evidence and the statutory rules of evidence collection, aimed at the development of inner conviction, are mutually supportive, resulting in the publicity of criminal proceedings. Secondly, legal rules ensuring the implementation of "capital amnesty" exclude the free assessment of evidence and introduce a formal approach to both its collection and assessment, which results in the loss of publicity of criminal proceedings. Thirdly, the reason for the rejection of free assessment of evidence is the legislator's mistrust of the officials of the preliminary investigation agencies and the court. The reasons for this distrust lie in the lack of proper motivation and reasonableness of their decisions. Fourthly, it is concluded that it is inadmissible to conceptually transform the criminal procedural law with economic interests, distrust of the court and officials of the preliminary investigation bodies. In this connection, it is proposed either to abandon the continuation of the "capital amnesty" or to no longer consider acts for which criminal responsibility is suspended as a crime, but rather as administrative offences or criminal misdemeanours. The authors declare no conflicts of interests.