Abstract

The article presents the main concepts for defining and describing delusions and delusional ideas used in modern clinical psychiatry and philosophy of psychiatry. Their analysis and comparison are carried out, the main differences in the psychiatric and philosophical understanding of delusions are indicated. It is demonstrated that modern clinical psychiatry considers delusional ideas inaccessible to understanding, and therefore considers them purely as a symptom of mental disorder. The author proposes to reconsider this approach and focus on interpreting delusions, giving them meaning, and finding methods for their analysis. The author identifies the difficulties that arise in the process of interpreting delusions by a person who does not suffer from a mental disorder. The fundamental difference in building a picture of the world in mentally healthy people and people suffering from mental disorders is emphasised. The hypotheses put forward in the philosophy of psychiatry on how to understand delusional judgements are demonstrated. One of the hypotheses, the "doxastic" position, considers delusional judgements to be a special case of false statements and suggests that they should be analysed in the same way as any other false judgement. Another hypothesis, the reaction to pathological experience, suggests that delusional judgements are a reaction to a unique pathological experience. Delusional ideas arise in an attempt to explain these experiences, and this approach allows for a greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying delusional judgements. A rationalist approach to the interpretation of delusions is also presented, which assumes that pathological changes occur at a higher level than direct perceptions. This approach is based on the analysis of the delusional statements themselves, trying to find out what the changes in the patient's attitudes may be. According to the rationalist approach, the altered ideas of a mentally ill person are a consequence of their attitudes towards themselves and the world, and this is what sets the stage for the possible emergence of delusions. According to the rationalist approach, delusional ideas are not evaluated for their truth or falsity, as they are outside of any possible experience. Therefore, the rationalist approach allows us to understand what the patient's beliefs are that caused his or her delusions. It is determined that the described approaches change the perception of delusions as a sign or symptom of mental illness and do not ignore its own content in explaining mental disorder. The philosophy of psychiatry understands the space in which delusional discourse is constructed as a sphere that can be described and should be studied.

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