Управление обязательствами в асимметричных альянсах: опыт России

Abstract

Since the second half of the 20th century, military alliance ceased to play an essential role in ensuring the security of major powers. Meanwhile, asymmetric alliances, in which a major power remained an incontestable leader surrounded by weak parties, proliferated across international system. The literature explains these relationships in terms of an exchange in dissimilar benefits between states, following the formula “security for autonomy”. This explanation seems generally plausible, but it does not reveal exact benefits for a major power from establishing control over the weak states. This article intends to deepen our theoretical understanding of why states resort to asymmetric alliances and to test the significance of suggested propositions through an in-depth analysis of the Russian record of alliances. Russia built allied relations with several neighbors but does not extend similar mechanisms to partners in other geographic areas. This policy is puzzling, since it comes into dissonance with the foreign policy stance that international security and global order should be built on the principle of the indivisibility of security and inclusive international institutions. In its foreign policy discourse Russia strongly condemns closed formats with limited participation. The study solves two interrelated problems. First, it helps to deepen understanding of Russian foreign policy strategy and the role of various instruments of military-political cooperation in ensuring national interests. Secondly, it allows to test the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances, assessing its applicability to a hard case. The article reveals Russia’s sensitivity to direct and opportunity costs as well as to potential risks of binding security commitments. However, it relies on asymmetric alliances with neighboring countries to reap the benefits of increasing power projection opportunities, legitimizing its foreign policy initiatives, limiting freedom of maneuver for its competitors, and stabilizing its strategic surrounding. The Russian experience of building relations with allies differs significantly from the American one, which, due to the scale of the US alliance network, is often presented as a model one. Nevertheless, it is quite consistent with the provisions of the theory of asymmetric alliances.