Abstract

The first wave of the civil war in Libya, which ended after the assassination of Muammar Qaddafi in the fall of 2011, did not put an end to the civil conflict in the country. It is shown that in many respects the second wave of the civil war in Libya (the beginning of the active phase of which can be dated May 16, 2014) was a direct continuation of the first wave (February–October 2011). By 2014, it became clear that the Libyan crisis could not be resolved solely through a change in political regime. The revolutionary processes in the case of Libya proved to be fatal for the entire political system, marking the almost complete dismantling of state institutions. Thus, the overthrow of the dictator in Libya did not ultimately solve anything, and the military-political forces that fought in the first wave of civil conflict against Muammar Qaddafi launched an open full-scale armed struggle with each other in May 2014, marking the beginning of the second wave of civil war. This article analyzes the logic and course of the second wave of the civil war in Libya, as well as explores the genesis of key military and political forces in Libya after 2011. The authors conclude that at present time a stalemate has developed in the country. And the impossibility of a military victory for either side of the Libyan conflict allows us to hope for a new agreement between all its parties. Acknowledgements. This article is an output of a research project implemented as part of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in 2021 with support by the Russian Science Foundation (Project Number 19-18-00155).

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