Abstract
The ethics of Kant and the ethics of Crusius are strikingly similar. This is manifested in a whole range of principles and concepts. Crusius’ moral teaching hinges on the rigorous moral law which has to be obeyed absolutely, and which makes it different from other prescriptions that are binding only to a relative degree. This is very close to the Kantian distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. Another salient feature of Crusius’ moral teaching is the stress laid on the sphere of internal motives. It is the inner motive that determines the morality of an act, rather than the external form of the act. These and some other features of Crusius’ ethics suggest a possible influence of Crusius on Kant. The possibility of such influence has repeatedly come under close scrutiny. The first works devoted to this problem date to the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Pointers to the possibility of such influence are semantic and structural similarities of the two thinkers’ systems. Besides, it is an unchallengeable fact that Kant was fairly familiar with the main theses of Crusian philosophy. Some scholars proceed from the study of Kantian vocabulary. Some of the terms Kant uses, especially in his early works which later formed the basis of his ethical teaching in the critical period, can be traced to the terms of Crusian philosophy. However, an alternative view is that Kant was primarily influenced by Wolffian philosophy (mainly through Baumgarten), while the direct influence of Crusius remains unproven. I examine both points of view and propose my own solution to the problem.
Highlights
Этика Канта и этика Крузия поражают своим видимым сходством
When looking at the moral teaching of Crusius we discover some striking similarities with Kant’s ethical system
Of the moral law: “Do out of obedience to the will of your Creator as your natural and necessary Lord everything that corresponds to the perfection of God and to the essential perfection of one’s own nature and [the nature] of all the other creatures, which corresponds to the relations of things created by Him [God] among themselves, and eschew the opposite”9 (Crusius, 1767, p. 249). From this moral law Crusius derives the definition of the nature of virtue as fulfilment of the material principle, fulfilment, with due inner intent, i. e. readiness to fulfil what corresponds to the perfection of God, of oneself and other people solely in obedience to God (Crusius, 1767, p. 250)
Summary
Для начала рассмотрим подробнее основные понятия и положения кантовской этической системы. The concepts “from the motive of duty” and “morality” stress that an act is performed exclusively in order to comply with the moral law Only such acts, according to Kant, can be deemed to be truly virtuous. Если же мы от этой сферы внутренних мотивов отвлекаемся или же, всматриваясь в нее, находим, что к поступку человека определило что-то иное, нежели уважение к повелениям морального закона, но при этом поступок внешне соответствует требованиям морального закона, тогда мы можем говорить лишь о легальности такого поведения 4. Если в акте определения воли имелся какой-либо иной мотив, кроме одного лишь уважения перед моральным законом, это действие уже не может быть моральным, как бы возвышенны устремления человека при этом ни были. If the subjectively determined goals pursued through performed acts are eliminated, the prescriptions themselves cease to be obligatory They cannot be categorical imperatives, but are merely hypothetical imperatives.
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