카이로회담 전후 연합국 군사동맹의 비판적 검토

Abstract

This paper tried to critically examine the military alliance between the U.S., Britain, and China through China’s role in the Cairo talks and changes in the Allied strategy against Japan before and after the talks. Immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the national government proposed a military alliance to the West, and a military alliance was signed between the United States, Britain, and China. However, each country had a different view of the Allied military alliance. As a result, the difference in strategy between the US, UK, and Chinese military leaders resulted in Burma being occupied by the Japanese military in a short period of time. Since 1943, as the war has developed in favor of the Allies on the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific, the Allies held Cairo talks for the post-war Asian initiative and the Japan-Japan strategy. Chiang Kai-shek’s participation in the Cairo conference led China to become one of the four major powers. But it was a semi-final in justification, not a real one.
 In Tehran, the Allies decided to end the war in Asia after ending the war in Europe first. Of course, the strategy agreed upon by the Allies at the Tehran talks may have been a way to quickly end World War II as a whole. However, this strategy could have a huge negative impact on Eastern Europe and Asia, even if the damage to the Chinese national government was left alone. First of all, in Europe, the Soviet Union advanced to Germany and influenced post-war Eastern Europe, and then in Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union exerted influence over Manchuria rather than other powers, which had a decisive impact on the outcome of the post-war civil war.