Abstract

My aim is to demonstrate the specificities and differences between transcendental deduction of concepts and deduction of the fundamental principles of pure practical reason in Kant’s metaphysics. First of all it is necessary to examine Kant’s attitude to the metaphysics of his time and the problem of its new justification. Kant in his philosophy explicated not only the theoretical world of cognition, but also the practical world of freedom. Accordingly, the fundamental means of proving metaphysics’ claims are the deduction of pure concepts of understanding (deduction of experience) and the deduction of the principles of pure practical reason (deduction of freedom). The underlying premises of the Kantian project of reviving metaphysics, “the Copernican Turn”, the critical methods and basic principles of transcendental (formal) idealism also provide the methodological basis of transcendental deduction, a new method of proving the claims of metaphysics in various spheres of human being. Proceeding from the above, I analyse the essence, structure and the peculiarities as well as the differences between the deduction of experience and the deduction of freedom. I single out the following features of the two types of deduction. First, theoretical use of reason is aimed at objects while practical reason is aimed at noumena, the foundations of will and freedom. Second, the transcendental deduction of space and time, as well as the deduction of categories, is preceded by transcendental reduction, which is absent in the deduction of freedom. Third, Kant orients the methodological movement of deductions in opposite directions. Theoretical deduction proceeds from pure forms of sensible intuition to concepts of understanding and thence to fundamental principles. Practical deduction proceeds from a priori principles to the concepts of the metaphysics of morals and thence to moral feelings. Fourth, deduction in the theoretical sphere forbids speculative reason to go beyond experience. Practical deduction has pointed to the intelligible world and has proved its “legitimacy”.

Highlights

  • Общеизвестно, что «ничего не бывает без основания»

  • It is a consequence of that great principle that nothing occurs without a reason, and of the principle that there must be a reason why one thing occurs rather than another” (Leibniz, 2000, p. 84). This natural order of things, Leibniz argued, has on the one hand its own realis ratio as the cause of existence and action and is, on the other hand, the necessary foundation of our cognition. This axiom [...] that there is nothing without a reason, must be considered one of the greatest and most fruitful of all human knowledge, for upon it is built a great part of metaphysics, physics, and moral science; without it, the existence of God cannot be proved from his creatures, nor can an argument be carried from causes to effects or from effects to causes, nor any conclusions be drawn in civil matters (Leibniz, 1989, p. 227)

  • Because Kant was explicating the theoretical world of cognition and the practical world of freedom, deductions of experience and freedom became the fundamental methods of proving the claims of metaphysics

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Summary

Introduction

Общеизвестно, что «ничего не бывает без основания». В свое время эту мысль, на первый взгляд кажущуюся простой и тривиальной, тем не менее упорно отстаивал в своих работах великий энциклопедист Г. This natural order of things, Leibniz argued, has on the one hand its own realis ratio as the cause of existence and action (the reason being the Perfect Entity, or God) and is, on the other hand, the necessary foundation of our cognition. This axiom [...] that there is nothing without a reason, must be considered one of the greatest and most fruitful of all human knowledge, for upon it is built a great part of metaphysics, physics, and moral science; without it, the existence of God cannot be proved from his creatures, nor can an argument be carried from causes to effects or from effects to causes, nor any conclusions be drawn in civil matters При этом я не буду касаться ни эмпирической дедукции понятий, ни метафизической

Исходные предпосылки дедукции
Initial Premises of Deduction
Сущность дедукции опыта и ее необходимость
The Essence of Deduction of Experience and its Necessity
Dieter Henrich rightly notes that
Дедукция трансцендентальной свободы
Deduction of Transcendental Freedom
Различия дедукции опыта и дедукции свободы
Differences between Deduction of Experience and Deduction of Freedom
Conclusion
Список литературы
Об авторе
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