Ֆալիբիլիզմի զարգացումը 19-րդ դարի պրագմատիզմի փիլիսոփայությունում / THE DEVELOPMENT OF FALLIBILISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAGMATISM IN 19TH CENTURY

Abstract

The primary goal of the article is to reveal the development of fallibilism and its main principles within the epistemological and scientific frameworks of various 19thcentury philosophers, with a particular emphasis on the pragmatist movement. To achieve its goal, the article seeks to address several key objectives: to scrutinize the epistemological, scientific, and other philosophical perspectives of numerous 19th-century thinkers who played a pivotal role in shaping and advancing fallibilism; to investigate the similarities and distinctions among the pragmatist philosophers who significantly contributed to the development of fallibilism; and to identify the main trajectories in the emergence and expression of fallibilism during this period. Many primary sources and articles were used in the research, employing a variety of methodological approaches including analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, analogy, and historical comparison. The main conclusion of the research is that several 19th-century philosophers and scientists, notably Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, played a critical role in articulating and advancing the core tenets of fallibilism. Their work highlighted the inevitability of perpetual doubt and error in the process of knowledge acquisition, underscoring the significant epistemological and methodological roles of fallibilism. This research demonstrates that the foundational principles of fallibilism were not only recognized in the 19th century but were also applied across various domains of knowledge, addressing social and political issues. Such insights are crucial for future investigations into the broader applicability of fallibilism beyond strictly epistemological contexts.