Abstract
This study points out that the limitation of the analytical framework of “Autonomous Defense (or jishu bōei) vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance” that scholars on Japan's postwar national security policy often use. On previous researches, this framework is applied arbitrarily and “Autonomous Defense” is compatible with “Alliance” in some cases. Then this research adopts analysis by “Defense Force Building vs. Operation” as another angle of vision. And it explains that the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance (or gentei shōkibo shinryaku dokuryoku taisho)” which appeared in the “National Defense Program Outline (or bōei taikō) 1976” and the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation 1978.” This concept played the role as a measure for “Defense Force Building” in the two and then abandoned in the NDPO 1995 and the Guidelines 1997 by “Operational” request.
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