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Abstract

In this paper, I starts on the critical basis against both the theory of the possibility of acts other than the actual act presented by the moral theory of responsibility on one hand, and the prevention theory of responsibility on the other hand. The problem of the former is that it is incompatible with the fact of determinism, which we find it difficult to deny empirically, and the problem of the latter is that it denies the responsibility, the affirmation of which is the basic principle of criminal law as well as fundamental moral intuition in our society.
 Instead, I argues that the ground of responsibility should be put on reasons for action. My thesis is that one has responsibility for his/her act when he/she has the ability to rationalize an act at the time of the act, but fails to justify his/her reason objectively, even though there is no possibility of another act. the actor can be held responsible for the act. I also tried to explain what is the practical meaning of responsibility in reality.
 My thesis implies that determinism and responsibility can be compatible. But according to my thesis, the meanings of determinism and responsibility need to be understood in a weaker sense. In other words, the determinism I have in mind is the thesis that making reasons for an act is non-deterministic, but within too limited range, so that other acts other than the actual act cannot be performed under the circumstances and conditions at the time of the act. And the premise of responsibility in my thesis is not the ability to do acts other than the actual act, but the ability to justify the act by reasons. Although these are revisions of each traditional strong
 position, it still has a valid practical meaning in that it is based on our daily experience while preserving the core value of responsibility.