融资惯性、控制权收益和民营化效率——基于星美联合的案例分析

Abstract

Based on the facts of Stellar Megaunion Corporation,this paper finds that after the privatization of state-owned enterprises,the private enterprise that take over the privatized state-owned enterprises still get continuous bank loans with quite low interest rates,and financing inertia resulting from this kind of path-dependence supports the rapid growth of corporate assets through massive debt. At the same time,because privatization has never changed the control right benefits of the controlling shareholders,the controlling shareholders who take over the privatized state-owned enterprises have strong motive for tunneling the accumulated assets resulting from financing inertia by related party transactions,and escape from the constraints of large amounts of bank loans further through making full use of the bankruptcy reorganization and the defects of non-tradable shares reform,thereby resulting in double losses of state-owned assets. It is thus clear that the true motive for privatization is the critical factor affecting privatization efficiency,and the separation between control right and residual claim straightly leads to the tunneling of listed companies by large shareholders. And defects of state-owned capital management,loan management of financial enterprises and the regulation of transactions of listed companies provide a guarantee of double losses of state-owned assets. This paper makes a pioneering research of specific sources of benefits from control right and argues that financing inertia leads to the increase in controlling shareholders' benefits from control right after privatization,which is a concealed channel concerning double tunneling of state-owned assets. Therefore,the perfection of loan mechanisms in financial institutions and the enhancement of the regulation and punishment of tunneling listed companies are the basis of avoiding the expropriation of state-owned assets by financing inertia in the process of state-owned enterprise withdraw and private enterprise entry.