Abstract
Kant’s concept of Gesinnung reveals the whole range of its problematic potential when it has to be translated into other languages: there are no ready-made equivalents. The problem stems from the evolution of this concept in Kant himself from the pre-Critical (“mode of thinking”, “convictions”, “virtuousness”, “virtues”, “sentiments”, “inclinations”, “aspirations”) to the critical works and then in the Critical period in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Further problems arise from the complex pre-Kantian history of the concept of Gesinnung which influenced Kant’s philosophy. Among the sources that had a particularly strong impact both on the meaning of Kant’s concept of Gesinnung and on its perception the most important are various translations of the Bible — both into German and into Russian — as well as Latin works by A. G. Baumgarten and German works by C. A. Crusius and M. Mendelssohn. I have also included an overview of English versions of translations of Kant’s term Gesinnung (disposition, attitude, conviction, sentiment, comportment of mind, intention, Gesinnung) and their more important differences and have shown the unhistorical character of the translation arguments in modern English-speaking Kant scholarship which totally ignores pre-Kantian history and the context of Kant’s contemporaries. Proceeding from this study the next part of the article will offer my own interpretation of Kant’s concept of Gesinnung in the Critical period and suggest a uniform translation of the term into Russian with a corresponding grounding of my choice.
Highlights
Kant’s concept of Gesinnung reveals the whole range of its problematic potential when it has to be translated into other languages: there are no ready-made equivalents
Further problems arise from the complex pre-Kant ian history of the concept of Gesinnung which influenced Kant’s philosophy
Perhaps the most expressive thesis in this connection is Kant’s thesis that the essential good in acting according to the categorical imperative “consists in the disposition (Gesinnung), let the result be what it may” (GMS, AA 04, S. 416; Kant, 2011, p. 61) — such phrases of Kant led in the twentieth century to the juxtaposition of the so called “ethic of conviction” and “ethic of responsibility”
Summary
Kant’s concept of Gesinnung reveals the whole range of its problematic potential when it has to be translated into other languages: there are no ready-made equivalents. Что в этот период Кант употребляет это слово уже как сложившийся термин. One can hardly say that during this period Kant uses this word as an established term Russian translations of these pre-Critical works contain — not implausibly — a range of variants: “mood”, “aspiration”, “inclination”, “conviction”, “virtue”, “virtuousness”, “mode of thinking”. 61) — such phrases of Kant led in the twentieth century to the juxtaposition of the so called “ethic of conviction” and “ethic of responsibility” It speaks not of a feeling, inclination or an emotional impulse, but of the pure intellectual disposition of a moral character linked to the maxims of will, a readiness to act out of duty in accordance with categorical imperative. The real change occurs in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), in which Kant uses the concept Gesinnung more than fifty times, i. 7 “Die Billigkeit ist Uebereinstimmung des Willens auch mit den innern Gesinnungen andrer Menschen; das strenge Recht aber mit den geäußerten Gesinnungen.” 8 “Die Gesinnung aus Pflicht, aus Achtung fürs Gesetz zu handeln, ist Tugend.”
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
