Судьбоносность или этапность 1912 г. в ухудшении германо-британских отношений в предвоенные годы

Abstract

The article analyzes the development of German-British maritime contradictions in the short period of 1904-1912 in the context of determining the position of the upper date in the history of relations between the two countries in the pre-war period. The thesis about the fateful character of 1912, presented in the research literature, seems to be exaggerated to some extent. Based on the available published data and materials from the German Military Archive (Freiburg — BA-MA.RM) it is shown that the first serious aggravation, due to the rapid development of the German fleet on the basis of the law of 1900, arose in 1904-1905, due the real danger of a military confrontation. The subsequent "dreadnought revolution" committed by the British in 1905 only further exacerbated this general trend and gave the naval arms race a new impetus. Berlin answered to the dreadnought challenge, thrown by the British, with the novels of 1906, 1908, 1912. The Germans used them as a try to translate into reality the thesis, formulated by the Naval State Secretary A. Tirpitz, formulated at the end of the 19th century — he offered to make a fleet that would be 2/3 of the power of the British one. The attempts, made by both sides in the period of 1908-1912 to achieve a mutually satisfactory treaty on naval armaments, failed. The reason for this is the maximization by the Germans and the British of their military and political demands in the negotiations and the lack of desire for compromise. The mission of the English Military Minister R. Holden to Berlin in February 1912 demonstrated the last unrealized chance to come to an agreement. On the basis of the analysis of all the events of 1904-1912, it is concluded that 1912 was not so desperately fateful and did not predetermine the major war as a result, but a turning point, although completing the stage of the general process of deteriorating relations between the two states.