Abstract

This article concludes that UNSC economic sanctions on Byungjin Policy were effective in US-North Korea Hanoi Summit, investigating Kim Jong Un’s decision making to pursuit summit diplomacy was motivated by the urgency of sanctions lift. It can be presumed that Kim’s cost-benefit calculation pursuing his political survival, which is the top priority of the North Korean foreign policy, can be worked via not a nuclear programme but an economic improvement along with US-NK normalization.
 To empirically confirm research hypothesis whether UNSC sanctions coerced the failure of Byungjin Policy, this article investigated the correlation both Byungjin Policy and UNSC sanctions in 2013-2019. As a result, it is probable that dictator Kim would determine a strategic trade-off between dismantling Yongbyon nuclear facility and UNSC sanctions lift to secure economic improvement, which is a preliminary affair to prolonging his tenure in office. Given the effectiveness of UNSC sanctions on Byungjin policy, economic pressure on North Korean regime was at least effective to induce Kim’s recalibration as to political survival although economic sanctions hardly coerce North Korea’s denuclearization.

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