Abstract

Consociational democracy was systemized by A. Lijphart in the early 20th century as a democratic model suggested as an alternative to limits of majority democracy that a winner takes all. A. Lijphart points out forming the largest government, recognition of mutual veto power, member proportional of the parliament and cabinet, and recognition of a minority of autonomous rights as prerequisites for consociational democracy. According to these elements, Switzerland is applicable to a consociational democratic state of the typical Bottom-up structure that completed present federalism based on decentralism which recognized equal rights regardless of the alliance size starting from the Old Swiss Confederacy in the 13th century. Especially, initiative and referendum done at the level of the 26 states and more than 2,000 Gemeindes can be the key resident participation system which checks the nation and local governments and enables sharing power through equal participation as the new opportunities that minority opinions are not excluded but included. Especially, because the initiative and referendum systems are linked together and play a role of controlling power and have the structure that they can be done regarding taxation, increases in budget, etc which have an important effect on local finance, they more accord with the idea of local self-government that the residents themselves are the main agents of the regions. And because they have the structure that oppositions to local councils' decisions can be done by initiative and referendum, they make the residents play an enough role as the final surveillant of local decisions. Because communications between residents and regions, among residents, and regions and the central government continue to be done in the initiative process, referendum, and general assembly of the residents and the preparation process in the resident participation system of the swiss style like this, the resident participation system in the Swiss consociational democracy is the most important element of discussion premised on conversations and communications. In comparison with this, because the Korean resident participation system has the structure that initiative and referendum are not mutually linked but separately operated, it's the structure synergy effects of participation cannot be created. And because important details from a position of the residents are mostly excluded from resident participation, it is the structure that it is hard for the residents to actively participate in them. In addition, in the structure that local councils examine and vote for ordinances proposed by the residents, the need for changing their roles to more active for resident participation is raised because they are not different from the existing committees' examination. If legal consideration like this is done, the resident participation system which has more expanded since 2021 can play a role of driving the development of Korean local self-government and democracy.

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