경영자과신성향이 주가지체에 미치는 영향

Abstract

Purpose - This study deals with the manager's overconfidence and stock price delay, and verified whether the stock price delay phenomenon changes as the overconfidence increases.
 Design/methodology/approach - Manager overconfidence means that managers have over confidence in their positions or abilities, and was measured according to Schrand and Zechman (2012). Stock price delay is a phenomenon in which information of company is not immediately reflected in the stock price, but is reflected over time, and was measured by the method suggested in a study by Hou and Moskowitz (2005). The analysis subjects used in this study are companies listed on the KOSPI market between 2011 and 2019, and the final sample is 5,509 company-years.
 Findings - As a result of the verification, it was shown that the stock price delay decreased as the manager's overconfidence increased, and this effect was amplified as the foreign shareholder's share ratio increased and the number of follow-up financial analysts increased. This means that as the manager's overconfidence increases, he actively provides high-quality information to the capital market. In addition, as a result of subdividing the manager's overconfidence into the investment and capital raising aspects, the capital raising aspect has a significant effect on reducing stock delays. This can be interpreted as the fact that managers with overconfident tendencies have a greater incentive to satisfy investors' information needs.
 Research implications or Originality - In previous studies, the characteristics of managers with strong overconfidence have both positive and negative aspects. The results of this study are significant in that they clearly demonstrated the positive aspect through the market variable of stock price delay, and it is expected to help capital market stakeholders understand the characteristics of managers with a strong propensity for overconfidence.