대통령 거부권의 헌법적 한계

Abstract

The presidential veto power to demand reconsideration of a law passed by the National Assembly may be subject to constitutional limits. If such limits exist, debates may arise over their existence, the grounds on which they are based, and the specific nature of these limits. Considering the constitutional position of the president and the form of government, the presidential veto power is constrained by constitutional limits.
 Under the current constitution, the president is a part of the executive branch domestically, adopting a mixed form of government that is primarily presidential but incorporates elements of a parliamentary system. The democratic legitimacy granted to the president as an executive is theoretically equivalent to the democratic legitimacy granted to the legislature, which holds the fundamental legislative power. Even if the president is recognized to have the veto power as a participatory right in the legislative process, such authority cannot infringe upon or exclude the National Assembly’s legislative decision-making power.
 From the perspective of the principle of separation of powers, if the president were granted an unlimited veto power, it could potentially infringe on the judicial power of the Constitutional Court by conferring an abstract normative control authority. The exercise of the president’s veto power should be limited to bills that are clearly unconstitutional, incur substantial costs endangering the soundness of national finances, or are related to the president or his/her family. Beyond constitutional limits, if the presidential veto power is exercised, constitutional sanctions may be necessary through adjudication of power dispute or impeachment trials.