시민불복종의 법적 정당화 고찰

Abstract

The general view is that civil disobedience cannot be ‘legally justified’ because it is ‘an act that violates the law’, and that the disobedient must be willing to accept the legal consequences of his or her disobedience. However, as long as the value of civil disobedience is needed to resolve the partial breakdown of the system that the representative system cannot properly handle, is it impossible to recognize the legal justification beyond acknowledging moral justification for civil disobedience that fully accepts the entire legal order? This paper starts from this question and seeks to explore the possibility of legal justification of civil disobedience in relation to positive law. This is because acknowledging the role of civil disobedience in supplementing the blind spots of the representative system and seeking ways to legalize it to a certain extent is rather a way to expand the realm of the rule of law.
 The concept of legal justification for civil disobedience is being used vaguely, with its specific relationship to positive law unclear. Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to confirm the concept of legal justification of civil disobedience in relation to the Constitution and positive laws. This must begin with distinguishing between direct and indirect civil disobedience. That’s because the legal justification of civil disobedience itself or individual acts of disobedience varies depending on whether the target rule violated by civil disobedience is consistent with or inconsistent with the target law or policy that civil disobedience aims to protest.
 Jury nullification in the US jury system is an exceptional system in which a jury acknowledges that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a criminal trial, but finds him innocent for various reasons. As long as jury nullification, which is an important part of the jury system, is understood as a constitutional issue, the implications of jury nullification on the legal justification of civil disobedience are relevant. The device of jury nullification, which sometimes grants legal immunity to civil disobedience, provides an implication in interpreting the social rule provisions(Article 20) of our criminal law.
 As a result of a large-scale protest against the installation of nuclear missiles in Germany in the 1980s, the German Federal Constitutional Court finally discussed civil disobedience. In particular, in the 1986 decision, some Constitutional Court judges put forward a theory referred to as the constitutional influence of civil disobedience. The majority opinion in the 1995 decision, which followed over time, also presented an interpretation that respond implicitly to the theory presented by the dissenting opinion in 1986. Therefore, we will examine this theory, which provides important implications for the interpretation of the social rule.