Трактування реалізму Лідією Гінзбург

Abstract

The realism conception in the articles of L. Ginzburg is founded on social-psychological determinism in opinion of V. Markovich. The author of this article polemizes with Markovich and affirms that Ginzburg’s realism conception is out of these proportions. At first, in Ginzburg’s research the point at issue is about “the poetics of unpredetermined” ( about the poetics of not determined previously artistic devices) and the customized contexts in realistic texts. The researcher marks that a realist cannot designate the narrative events, characters and the word (its referential and style characteristics) according to tradition. Secondly, Ginzburg treats the realistic world’s “monism” not as substantial, but as functional category, “monism” for her is only adjustment for explanation of the world in the key, that is not antilogous for the positivistic world picture. However, the thesis of Ginzburg that “the irrational experience appears for a realist always in cause-and-effect relationships” requires the specification. In opinion of the author of this article, a realist cannot guarantee that “reasons” will be determined. In connection with this aspect the role of analysis changes in realism: it is not a cognition tool yet, but a process with independent significance and validity. This feature brings together realism and romanticism, although Ginzburg insists on its essential differentiating. Thirdly, Gizburg uses a thesis of realism “non selectiveness”. It is examined in the article as the demonstration of general literary tendency to extension of phenomena circuit which can be embraced by realism. In this plan Ginzburg is compared with D. Zatonskiy, V. Markovych, P. Davis and M. Seidel, who specifying “formal realism” of I. Watt. All these facts proclaim the applicability of Lidiia Ginzburg realism conception.