Аргументи проти морального реалізму

Abstract

The position of “moral realism”, in which, first, expressions defining the criterion of evaluation are treated as judgements with the meaning of “true/false”, and this criterion itself, second, is thought of as a condition which is a direct fact of independent of human decisions, defining the motive which people should follow, observing the norm-prescription which is thus a universal law, is subjected to critical scrutiny. The root meaning of moral realism is the claim that people are not responsible for moral institutions as their own decisions, they only subordinate their will to something that they must do because they have no choice, alienating their decisions. This real “moral law” is interpreted (in different versions) either as the will of a higher power, given by revelation, to whose decision-making people have nothing to do but must obey it; or as the objective conditioning of choice, learned through the reflection of experience as a natural law; or as a proven theorem whose content follows deductively as a conclusion from a priori comprehensible speculative-intuitive general principles. Despite the difference in the treatment of the ontological status and mode of knowledge of the moral law, all “moral realists” deny the relativity of moral values. However, none of the versions of moral realism clarifies in what sense value can be a value in a subject-less context (value for no one) and how it can be justified as universal by mere stating (accepting it as a condition). In this way “realism” denies itself, since it defines what is thought of as a decision-independent object by the decision to recognize it as independent of decisions (an alienated acceptance of the condition). Substantively, the proof of the existence of a real moral law as motivating is reduced to a tautological repetition of the definition and thus cannot be accepted as proof. In addition, moral realism relies on the false treatment as judgments of expressions that do not contain a description of fact (that is, they are not judgments), even though it relies on this description as a basis for considering something real.