Abstract
Symbol is produced by creative activity and is a thing. That is why reism is the ontology of symbol. This paper does not consider the limits of the forms of a thing (the approach of E.Cassirer and S.Langer), since the concept of form could witness only actual (not possible) existence, which does not belong to symbol ex definitione. It is known that an expression of a thing’s essential being (esse essentiale) leads to apophatism. This apo-phatism roots in theology. In the period of symbolism (second third of 19th – beginning of 20th century) apophatic essence of symbol is analyzed by A. Losev from the positions of phenomenology. The last Losev’s paper on symbol does not contain the concept of apo-phatism, but it stresses the “engendering capacity” of symbol, whereas in fact one should speak about individual creativity. An expression of existential being (esse existentiale) of symbol appears implicitly in the works of Brentano. His thetic judgment, interpreted as a description, is not only referential, but also ontological failure. Existential judgment of Brentano is an example of apophatism in philosophy, so that one could speak about apo-phatic philosophy. Creative activity in symbolism is directed towards the construction of tools that generate symbol (rather than symbol itself), primarily the symbolic languages. If such a language loses its links to being, symbol becomes sign. This gives Łukasiewicz an option to approach the creation of value as a symbolic evaluation. An introduction of a third truthevaluation leads to apophatism of the current moment of time and its replacement by the duration or change of the value of the mentioned evaluation. An interdiction for expression of a thing’s being, caused by creation of thing, and a current moment of time make symbol a subject of apophatic philosophy.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.