기업 내 노동조합의 특성과 원가하방경직성

Abstract

[Purpose] This study investigates the effect of a labor union and its characteristics on a firm’s cost behavior, with a particular focus on both listed and non－listed firms.
 [Methodology] We employ labor union data obtained from the Human Capital Corporate Panel (HCCP) provided by the Korea Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training. We examine how the labor union affects cost stickiness (selling, general, and administration costs) using the model developed by Anderson et al. (2003).
 [Findings] First, we find that firms exhibit cost stickiness in their cost behavior and the presence of labor unions mitigates this cost stickiness. These results suggest that labor unions serve as monitoring mechanisms, thus mitigating cost stickiness arising from agency problems. Second, the bargaining power of labor unions has no incremental impact on cost stickiness. However, we find that cost stickiness is alleviated only when labor unions and firms maintain a cooperative relationship. In other words, labor unions play the role of corporate governance structures as stakeholders of the firm only when labor－management relations are cooperative.
 [Implications] This study examines the impact of labor unions as one of the stakeholders in a firm’s economic decision－making process and their role in corporate governance in alleviating cost stickiness. It underscores the importance of a cooperative labor－management relationship, as labor unions effectively serve their monitoring role in the corporate governance structure only under such conditions. Furthermore, even in a sample primarily comprised of non－listed firms, labor unions can influence cost stickiness.