Abstract
The article is devoted to the analysis of L. Wittgenstein’s arguments for their compliance with the position of cultural relativism. Some aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy stimulating the emergence of the relativistic readings of his texts are considered. The author proves that Wittgenstein’s epistemic contextualism should not be identified with the relativistic principle and the philosopher’s views should not be interpreted in terms of relativism. In the present study, Wittgenstein’s ideas are discussed in relation to the problem of intercultural communication. The Austrian philosopher is clearly aware of our dependence on a certain tradition of rationality and worldview; he takes into account the fact of the variability of language games and world outlooks over time. Wittgenstein, however, recognizes that there are universal prerequisites for the access to different cultures in the form of the similar patterns of human behaviour, which places his position beyond the principle of cultural relativism.
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