«Иное»: ноэсис и онтология («Софист» 255c8–d7)

Abstract

The article provides a commentary on the “Sophist” 255c8–d7, where a question arises, whether it is necessary to introduce the eidos “Other” after the justification of Movement, Rest, Being, and Same as separate genera. In the discussion of the Other, two more eide resurface, τὰ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα, whose logical necessity in the course of the discussion stays in doubt. The question is raised, why was it necessary to introduce these types of being when discussing the genus of the “Other”? A brief summary of modern approaches to the passage is given; thereupon the ontological meaning of these eide is examined on the example of several Plato’s dialogues (“Phaedo”, “Symposium”, “Republic”, “Philebus”). Consulting the “Timaeus” allows us to show how these eide, in the form of two main genera (“paradigm” and “imprint”), relate to the division of existence into “self” and “reflection” in the “Sophist” (266a8–c4), and the third genus, “chora”, to the “nature of the Other” in the “Sophist”. The closeness of the descriptions of “chora” in the “Timaeus” with being figuring as Other in the analyzed passage from the “Sophist”, is reinforced by the description of being as Other in the “Parmenides”. It is concluded that the unexpected inclusion in the discussion of the five great genera of the two main eide of being indicates the ontological status of the “noetic whole” described through the interaction of the five great genera. In the final part of the paper, it is shown that the World Soul in the “Timaeus” is a “three-dimensional” cosmological image of the “noetic quintet” of the “Sophist”, which can probably explain the unnecessary, at first glance, inclusion of two ontological eide, τὰ αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά and τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα, in the logical reasoning about the need for a genus of the “Other”.