СОВЕТСКАЯ ПОМОЩЬ ИСПАНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКЕ В 1936–1939 гг.: СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ КОНСЕРВАТИВНЫЕ ВЕРСИИ

Abstract

The subject of the study is some modern conservative versions of the history of the Soviet Union’s military assistance to the Spanish Republic in 1936–1939. The aim of the article is to attempt a critical analysis of the new and revived versions of the motives of Soviet intervention in the Spanish conflict, of the involvement of the Soviet leadership in large-scale terror against civilians in the republican zone, of the degree of influence of the Soviet leadership and Soviet representatives in Spain on the governmental structure of the Spanish Republic, of the anti-fascist character of the war. The study has established the inconsistency of the versions about Soviet aid as a means of promoting the world revolution in Spain and as an attempt to draw the democratic and fascist states into a major war between themselves through the Spanish conflict, about the possibilities of Stalin in 1936 to manipulate the great powers. It has been proved that conservative historians exaggerate the degree of influence of Stalin and Soviet political representatives in Spain on the military-political leadership of the republic. The impact of the so-called “instruments” of Soviet influence in the Spanish Republic is also exaggerated. The first of the instruments is considered to be the relocation of part of the gold reserve to Moscow, which, allegedly, allowed the Soviet control over the finances of the republic to be established. The second is the activities of Soviet military advisers; the third is the Communist Party of Spain, which was part of the Comintern, and was considered as an obedient tool in the hands of Moscow. It was and still is traditional to attribute responsibility for unleashing large-scale terror against civilians in the republican zone to Stalin, which does not correspond to reality as convincingly proved by the British historian P. Preston in his famous work The Spanish Holocaust. The scale of terror was exaggerated in the republican zone and, accordingly, understated in the Francoist zone. The study shows the failure of attempts to distort the anti-fascist nature of the war waged by the Spanish Republic relying on the support of the Soviet Union, Mexico, the progressive public of most civilized countries of that time, as well as attempts to present the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco in 1936–1939 as quite respectable. The new and updated critical versions of the Soviet aid to the Spanish Republic considered in the article are the result of the neoconservative wave in western historiography, which influenced representatives of both the classical historical school and the adherents of postmodernism.