Abstract

In 1860-1870 s the British authorities in India tested various theoretical ideas and practical methods to prevent famines or minimize level of starvation and mortality: from total inaction in accordance with free-trade doctrine during Orissa famine (1866) and tough state regulation by means of organization of public works, large-scaled food procurement, market prices restrain during Bihar-Bengal famine (1873-1874) to a limited interference in the situation during Great famine (1876-1878). During this period, the British famine relief policy was notable for extremely inconsistency that could be referred to the incapacity of the colonial administration to suggest adequate solution of the crisis situations being unable to exceed the limits of predominated liberal economic doctrine of free market and laissez-faire. Moreover, in this period the Indian policy was excessively individualized and depended in a large degree on personal decisions of officials that led very often to contradictory steps from their side. Severe consequences of the famines, hot discussions in the public sphere, ruined careers and practical experience of these decades led to a formulation by the very beginning of 1880-s of more or less balanced famine policy that combined a range of indirect protective/preventive measures and a very restrained intrusion into market mechanisms.

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