생명의료윤리에서의‘자율성’에 대한 비판적 고찰

Abstract

The principle of autonomy has been introduced in lots of bioethics references explaining Kant’s conception of autonomy. “Autonomy in bioethics” is different from “autonomy in Kant.”The former is almost the same as principle of freedom. I examine the meaning of autonomy through the review of Beauchamp and Childress’ analysis and Miller’s, which do not reach Kant’s conception. I also try to propose some practical suggestion after this examination. Autonomy is different from freedom in that autonomy should include moral reflection. The aspect of moral reflection in autonomy may reflect cultural and/or relational consideration beyond individualistic conception of autonomy. This may contribute to establish a new conception of autonomy. Even a new conception of autonomy is still different from Kant’s in that the principle of autonomy is one of principles whereas Kant’s autonomy is one to produce moral norms. Thus principle of autonomy in bioethics cannot be considered to be the supreme one to resolve bioethical issues. Autonomy may not be respected when respecting one autonomy does harm to others or violates the principle of justice. In this respect, autonomy as a value may conflict other values such as life or justice. Which value is preserved is still a difficult question when we are faced with conflicts of values.