Философско-методологические основания современного правового реализма

Abstract

The paper deals with the problems of using realism in modern legal science (philosophy of law and the-ory of law) as a method or conceptually designed strategy of legal knowledge and legal understand-ing. The problem of realism in this sense is closely related to its philosophical and methodological foundations, which form the supporting framework of any legal concept. Questions of realism in the field of law cover a wide range of fundamental and applied aspects, so this paper deals mainly with topical issues of modern and contemporary philos-ophy of law and legal theory, in which realism in an explicit or implicit form is one of the main approach-es to the knowledge and interpretation of law. Now-adays, the problem of legal realism is mistakenly reduced to legal instrumentalism and pragmatism, which are only a special case of using realism as a setting of legal knowledge and legal understanding. The dominant trend in using the method of ontolo-gization of law is the revival of interest in the phe-nomenon of subjective reality, based mainly on so-cio-psychological and metaphysical arguments.