러셀, 베르그손, 그리고 이분법적 대립의 문제들

Abstract

This article aims to probe critically Bertrand Russell’s attack on Henry Bergson, one of the most influential thinkers in the early twentieth century, in the article, “The Philosophy of Bergson,” published in The Monist in 1912. According to Russel, the philosophy of Bergson is fundamentally dualistic, depending on the binary opposition between matter and life, space and time, Yet, Russel’s such a critique overlooks that Bergson seeks to a monism which merges matter with life by viewing both of them in terms of duration and to overcome the limitations of the dualistic division subject and object, the fundamental frame of the modern epistemology of the West. In addition, Russell fails to grasp accurately that for Bergson, intuition is not a binary opposition to intellect but the way of thought that penetrate into the essence of matter and life byovercoming the abstract and mediatory way of thinking of intellect.