Abstract

This paper investigates whether intra-household bargaining power affects couples` caregiving decisions during instances of competing parental demands for assistance. The primary focus is on examining how partners` bargaining power influences the relative allocation of time resources between parents and parents-in-law, assuming that children prefer to transfer caregiving resources toward their own parents over their parents-in-law. The findings in this study reject the bargaining theory that couple`s parental care behavior results from a bargaining process between the husband and the wife. More specifically, the results did not clearly show that children prefer to transfer caregiving resources toward their own parents over their parents-in-law. Decision-making power, measured by final decision-making authority, also failed to affect the relative care transfers.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call