ОСОБЛИВОСТІ АНАЛІЗУ ФІРМИ В ТЕОРІЇ ТРАНСАКЦІЙНИХ ВИТРАТ

Abstract

The company as a network of contracts is a manageable network of specific contracts based on limited rationality, opportunism and asset specificity. The main activity of the company is to monitor the implementation of contracts within the organization and outside it. The company as an organizational structure provides the achievement of new knowledge and new conditions, which are the result of the joint action of the members of the company's team and the trust between them. The company as a set of tangible assets represents a system of relations with suppliers in the process of vertical integration and inducement, implemented in the process of entering into incomplete contracts. Transactional costs and incomplete contracts imply that ownership of the tangible assets becomes crucial, and the structure of property rights encourages the development of integration processes and intercompany business. Contractual relationships, which constitute the economic basis of the company, develop under the influence of general trends in the economy and the internal processes of the company. At the same time, ways to reduce the transaction costs are of particular importance. Among them, organizational forms of economic activity play an important role, so the management structures should be more flexible and vary in accordance with changes in production processes and consumer preferences. The structure of the configuration of the property rights to assets regulates the company's relationships with suppliers and ensures a reduction in the level of transaction costs. The study of the company on the basis of theoretical and methodological approaches of the theory of transaction costs makes it possible to comprehensively analyze the preconditions, the economic nature, and the boundaries of the company. In today's environment, changes in the economy are causing dramatic shifts both within the company and between companies. The chain nature of modern economic activity contributes to the development of the theory of transaction costs, the deepening of such its directions as opportunism in the behavior of economic agents, suspicion and trust in the relations of counterparties.