СИРИЯ И ЛИВИЯ В «ДЕРЖАВНОЙ» ПОЛИТИКЕ ФРАНЦИИ

Abstract

The Syrian and Libyan directions of France’s foreign policy are examined in the article in a broader context - its desire to secure a «sovereign» role in the Mediterranean region. In this regard, it is shown how French diplomacy, faced with a lack of financial and economic capabilities, has tried and is still trying to rely on the resources of the European Union in solving this problem. In general, however, due to the weak interest of non-Mediterranean EU states in this region, France has to rely mainly on its own resources. This applies in particular to Syria and Libya, where France lost influence in the previous decade due to its blunders and is now working to become an important player again. The article analyzes the reasons and consequences of the erroneous policy of France in these countries and the strategy of President E. Macron aimed at rectifying the situation. It is noted that his approach is characterized by greater realism than the tactics of his predecessors N. Sarkozy and F. Hollande. At the same time, with regard to Syria, E. Macron still could not or did not dare to overcome the original concept of denying cooperation with the B. Assad regime, which predetermined the preservation of the marginal role of France in this country. E. Macron’s attempts to gain a foothold in Libya, first with the help of Marshal Kh. Haftar, then through participation in the process of conflict resolution, brought only ephemeral success in the form of an international conference in Paris on this issue in November 2021. France has not yet been able to oust other international players in Libya. In general, the Syrian and Libyan examples show the discrepancy between France's current ambitions and capabilities.