Аскетизм и юродство в философии Ф. Ницше

Abstract

The article considers the phenomena of asceticism and foolishness for Christ in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The author substantiates the thesis that asceticism and foolishness for Christ are subjects of Nietzsche's philosophical reflections. The author also shows that the figures of the ascetic and the holy fool also act as “conceptual characters” of Nietzsche's philosophizing. The author suggests that Nietzsche himself felt a tendency towards self-identification with these characters and therefore tried to “dis-identify”, which he did not always succeed in. The article concludes that Nietzsche's position in relation to asceticism is ambiguous and internally contradictory. The philosopher exposed and criticized ascetic ideals, but this criticism is also directed at himself. Nietzsche himself, his character and way of thinking reveal a significant degree of kinship with ascetic views. Therefore, Nietzsche's criticism of asceticism is in many ways an attempt to overcome the ascetic in himself. For this task, Nietzsche appeals not only to the figures of an atheist and a pagan, but also to the image of a jester, a holy fool. The author substantiates the idea that one of the main distinguishing features of the holy fool's lifestyle is that he does not seem to be what he really is. A real fool, a real insane person is not a holy fool. The holy fool undertakes the feat of appearing to be a fool or insane, while he himself is not. In this way, the holy fool renounces the world and himself in the world, the state when his behavior corresponded to the norms and criteria of this world. Thus, a view of the world from a reverse perspective is achieved. Something close to this mode of thought and behavior is found in Nietzsche's philosophy. His philosophizing is deeply personal, but, at the same time, he constantly does not show the reader who he really is. Nietzsche's style is a constant play with masks and disguises. As a result of the study, the author concludes that Nietzsche's position in the history of European philosophy can be characterized as foolishness for Christ. His doctrine is formed during the crisis of European metaphysics and is the self-awareness of this crisis. Belief in reason, in the ability to comprehend God in terms of reason, characteristic of Western philosophy, is denied. This conviction in the omnipotence of reason was criticized already in Kantian philosophy, but criticized by means of reason itself. This was the peculiar “cunning of reason”, which, having preserved itself as a tool of criticism, subsequently triumphed in Hegel's philosophy. The claim of reason to absolute significance cannot be refuted by means of reason itself. Nietzsche understood this. He realized that breaking the impasse in which Western metaphysics found itself thanks to the deification of reason requires a completely different path.