Снятие проблемы совместимости детерменизма со свободой воли

Abstract

This article is an attempt to question the very correctness of the term free will. The problem of the compatibility of determinism with free will is indicated, which seems to be valuable. Further, it is proposed to clarify the term free will, and not the term determinism, for it is the belief in free will that is being tried to preserve, since it is considered valuable. The author points out that what makes free will valuable is the responsibility for the past and the control of the future. It is assumed that a free person controls the future and is responsible for the past. The question is whether the term free will is not superfluous when we can speak about the freedom of the agent, and whether, in principle, will can have the property of being free. The author argues that freedom is an anthropological concept that is not applicable to will. The article provides evidence that the freedom of a person is not to do as one pleases, but to act precisely on the basis of one's motives, even those that one shares with society as its member, even those that are generated by rational thinking. Three meanings of the term will are considered, namely, will as a proper synonym for freedom with a different connotation, as a complex of motives, and as a function of higher nervous activity. Focusing on the last two, the author compares the power of will in the meaning of the function of the higher nervous activity with such a condition of freedom as the ability to be the source of one's actions. Flexibility of will in the meaning of a complex of motives compares such a condition of freedom as the ability to do otherwise. The author also points out the possible significance of free will as the spontaneity of will and emphasizes its anti-value. He proposes to abandon the use of the term free will and to replace it with the term internal freedom of the agent,and, in relation to will, to apply such descriptions as strength or flexibility, depending on the meaning of the term used: in the meaning of the function of higher nervous activity or in the meaning of a complex of motives. Finally, the author points to the fact that determinism is a condition of the agent's freedom. The author criticizes semi-deterministic concepts as a way to try on responsibility with indeterministic episodes generated by the spontaneity of will. The author considers two semi-deterministic concepts: where the causality gap occurs after the decision is made, but only in a certain percentage of cases the action is carried out, and where the causality gap occurs before the decision is made, but only when the opposite motives are equal. The author, arguing that the spontaneity of will is antivaluable, sees no point in such a reconciliation, and even sees harm, since, in the author's opinion, it is determinism that gives the agent of freedom more freedom, and therefore more responsibility.