Abstract

In this paper, Alexander Bird’s argument against semantic and functional-internalist description of the development of science in favor of a cumulative description in the article “What is scientific progress?” is critically comprehended. Bird distorts and limits the ideas of his opponents by transferring the specific properties of one type of scientific knowledge to another, in particular practical knowledge to theoretical knowledge and vice versa. After that, Bird reduces his opponents’ positions to his own. He also cites quite traditional arguments about the failure of “pessimistic induction”, not noticing that he himself uses it in the core of his argument. Furthermore, he fails to see the problematic nature of his approach, teleologically describing the history of science, and gives no answer to the obvious traditional objections to his position. The same applies to his statment that a critical position does not make a positive contribution to science, while he forgets about the argument about the positivity of knowledge gained as a result of criticism. Bird’s reduction of his opponents’ positions to his own, does not follow logically from his arguments either, and moreover, in its further development, it turns against him. The novelty of the research lies in the originality of the responses to both classical and innovative arguments put forward by Byrd.

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