Этикотеология Ричарда Суинберна и некоторые аспекты христианского креационизма

Abstract

Several subjects in Richard Swinburne’s analytic theology are estimated from the points of both rational conclusiveness and Christian tradition. Inductive proofs of the existence of God and criterium of simplicity in the explanation of the universe are being criticized. The first ones by such a reason that in the main theistic claims, in opposition to those in natural sciences, only abductive inferences, i.e. to the best explanation are applicable, the second one as not sufficiently warranted both by the progress of rational knowledge and Christian dogmatics. The idea of God’s obligations toward His creatures is interpreted as contradictory to creationism, the idea of His legalistic rights to hurt them as contradictory to morality, while the idea of His obligations and rights in general seems more natural for anthropomorphic religiosity (some cases of polytheistic interrelations between humans and gods in the past along with contemporary lawsuits against God are referred to in this context as extremal developments of a similar stance) than for classical theism advocated by Swinburne himself. Imposing restrictions on any “successful” generalized theodicy as built by means of calculation of God’s reasonings (cf. the ethics of calculations in Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism) from the side of created human mind is also offered, along with illustrative arguments in defence of the so-called sceptical theism which more properly could be called judicious one. By contrast, the idea of God’s emotions sui generis is approved as both reasonable and not contradicting to theistic personalism (without lowering it to anthropomorphism). The paper is concluded by appreciation of large perspectives as growing out of the subjects dealt with by Richard Swinburne.