Abstract

The U.S. foreign policy relies on the use of economic sanctions in relations with both China (PRC) and Russia (RF). The National Security Strategy of the United States identifies PRC and RF as significant threats to the U.S. However, the view of China concentrates on long-term trends, while Russia is an immediate challenge, especially after the launch of its Special Military Operation in Ukraine on February 2022. This difference must have a reflection on the level of sanctions policy against these two targets. The substance of such differences in terms of sanctions instruments in use as well as the quality and quantity of their implementation is central for this article. Another question is about the ways the U.S. Congress and Administration approach China and Russia in terms of sanctions. Are they really on the same page or do they compete in their approaches to Beijing and Moscow? In terms of methodology, Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) databases represent the major source for comparative analysis. Another source is the U.S. legal acts on sanctions against China and Russia and the practice of their implementation. The analysis reveals major differences in sanctions policy of the U.S. vis-à-vis the two adversaries. Washington implements much wider set of sanctions instruments against Russia in comparison with China. Major Russian companies and sectors of economy are the targets of different kinds of sanctions, while Chinese ones are targeted to a much less extent. The intensity of the use of sanctions is again much greater in the Russian case. Partisan differences in Congress on China are more salient than on Russia, however, disagreements are not critical in both cases. Further aggravation of Sino-American relations may mitigate the differences of sanctions against Russia and China in the future.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call